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THE IMPACT OF CLASS ACTIONS ON
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
MORDECAI ROSENFELD*
Plaintiffs filed an action on their own behalf and on behalf of all
other persons who had invested in The Philanthropic Annuity Institu-
tion, charging that the defendants had breached the fiduciary duty
they owed to all the investors. Defendant Thompson moved to have
the complaint dismissed on the ground that there were "a great num-
ber of persons" who were members of plaintiffs' class who had not
been and could not be brought before the Court. The Court overruled
the demurrer:
It is evident, that if occasion here should arise to resort here for an account,
as it would be impossible to bring all persons interested, the suit must be
against some, being Proprietors, and accountable parties, instituted by some
on behalf of all . . . but that difficulty was overcome upon this principle, that
it was better to go as far as possible towards justice than to deny it altogether.,
The Court rendering this decision was not a United States District
Court interpreting Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
but rather the Court of Chancery in England speaking in the fiftieth
year of the reign of George III.2 This case illustrates that class actions
in the securities and corporate fields did not begin as of July 1, 1966,
when the amendments to Rule 23 became effective.3 In the period
since 1966, however, class actions have proliferated in the federal
courts. This article will suggest that the development of class actions
has not only had a dynamic effect on the securities and corporate
laws, which all would concede, but has had a beneficial effect as well,
a conclusion that has been sharply contested. 4
* A.B. 1951, Brown University; LL.B. 1954, Yale University; Member of the New York
Bar. The author represents the plaintiff in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (discussed in this
article) as well as plaintiffs in other class actions.
I. Cockburn v. Thompson, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1008 (Ch. 1809).
2. See also City of London v. Perkins, I Eng. Rep. 1524 (H.L. 1734); Mayor of York v.
Pilkington, 26 Eng. Rep. 180 (Ch. 1737).
3. The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective in 1938, but class actions
in the United States date back in time to at least before Equity R. 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912).
See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 288 (1853).
4. Compare AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS ASS'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1972) (an
attack on class actions) with Weinstein, The Class Action Is Not Abusive (pts. 1-2), N.Y.L.J.,
May I, 1972, at 1, col. 3, May 2, 1972, at 1, col. 3 (a defense of class actions) and Pomerantz,
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Class actions have been more responsible than any other recent
development in the law for the creation of new ideas and the challeng-
ing of old doctrines. Even the basic concept of what is meant by the
term "class" is being remolded through the mechanics of the "fluid
class" theory, so that some courts, in an attempt to resolve the prob-
lem of how to manage efficiently a recovery involving millions of
small claimants, 5 no longer find it always necessary to channel a
recovery only to the individual class members who incurred the dam-
age. In a parallel development, the element of individual reliance,
until now a sine qua non for recovery in a fraud action,' is being by-
passed. But perhaps the greatest impact of the class action has been
its deterrent effect; financial statements and press releases are doubt-
less becoming more accurate because of the fear of a class action.
In order to place these substantive points in perspective, it is
important that the procedural framework governing federal class ac-
tions be reviewed. The controlling regulation is, of course, Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23(a), which sets forth
the prerequisites of a class action,7 requires that the class must be
numerous 8 and that the questions of law or fact at issue must be
New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW.
1259 (1970) (a defense of class actions).
5. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)(D) states that "the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action" is one of the factors to be considered by the
court in determining whether a class action should be maintained. See also FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3)(D), Comment, 39 F.R.D. 95, 104 (1966). One of the problems of management of a
class action is devising a recovery technique which will apply to the entire class. See Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 567 (2d Cir. 1968).
6. One of the traditional limitations imposed on liability for securities fraud is proof that
the plaintiff actually relied upon the allegedly fraudulent statement. See List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965); Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329
F.2d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1964). See also Comment, Reliance Under Rule lob-S: Is the "Reasona-
ble Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 562 (1972); Comment, Spurious Class Actions
Based Upon Securities Frauds Under the Revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 35 FORD.
L. REv. 295 (1966); Note, Class Action Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised
Rule 23, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1150, 1156-57 (1968). In its notes accomppnying the 1966
amendments to Rule 23, the Advisory Committee stated that "material variation . . . in the
kinds or degrees of reliance" might militate against a class action. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3),
Comment, 39 F.R.D. 95, 103 (1966).
7. The text of Rule 23(a) reads:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
8. Rule 23(a) has been satisfied by a class of only forty persons. Swanson v. American
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common to all members of the class. Rule 23(b) subsumes all class
actions into three categories, the last one of which, Rule 23(b)(3),
includes the so-called "spurious" class actions of pre-1966 days
Virtually all of the class actions in the securities and corporate fields
are brought under this category. The significance of categorizing a
case under (b)(3) is that it automatically activates the notice require-
ments of Rule 23(c)(2):
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstan-
ces, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (a) the court will
exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (b) the judg-
ment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request
exclusion; and (c) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he
desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
As the law has evolved since 1966, the notice requirement has as-
sumed an almost decisive role in many class actions. Although ade-
quate notice is a requirement in class actions, this article will suggest
that it should be relegated to the level of a technicality. The broad
purposes and achievements of class actions should not be funneled
through and perhaps frustrated by the complications with which some
courts burden Rule 23(c)(2) notices.
A second procedural rigidity affecting class actions arises from
the Supreme Court's decision in Snyder v. Harris,1" which held that
class members cannot aggregate their claims to reach the $10,000
amount required for federal diversity jurisdiction." The Second Cir-
Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Fidelis Corp. v. Litton
Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 164, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (between thirty-five and seventy persons
held sufficient).
9. A "spurious" class action (involving, for example, a common accident) was an action in
which the questions of law or fact were common as to all members of the class, but in which a
decision as to one class member was not binding as to non-appearing class members. On the
other hand, a judgment in a "true" class action (involving, for example, the legality of a bond
issue) would bind all class members, both appearing and non-appearing. In general, Rule
23(b)(3) cases reflect the old spurious class action and Rule 23(b)(1) cases reflect the old true
class actions. One of the purposes of the amendments to Rule 23 adopted in 1966 was to bind
all class members in Rule 23(b)(3) actions who did not affirmatively exclude themselves. It
should be noted that the line between Rule 23(b)(1) cases and Rule 23(b)(3) cases is not always
clear. For a general discussion of the relationship between the old class action categories and
the new rules, see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969).
10. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
II. In diversity cases the amount in controversy must exceed $10,000 before the federal
district court has jurisdiction of the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). In Snyder, the plaintiff
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cuit recently extended the Snyder holding by denying federal diversity
jurisdiction to a class action even where the named plaintiff had a
claim in excess of $10,000 on the ground that Snyder requires each
class member to have damages in excess of $10,000.12 The obvious
effect of Snyder has been to close the federal courts to all class
actions except those in which jurisdiction rests on a federal statute
that does not include the $10,000 requirement. Consequently, almost
all class actions in federal courts have been brought under the anti-
trust 13 and securities" laws, where there is no jurisdictional require-
ment of $10,000. This, in turn, has caused the most recent and dra-
matic changes in corporate law to be in the securities and antitrust
areas.
CLASS ACTIONS IN SECURITIES LAW CASES
Class actions have been used most frequently under the proxy,5
and anti-fraud" provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) and the registration provisions of the Securities Act
of 1933 (Securities Act).17 Although pleadings frequently allege
wrongs under several of these sections, for purposes of analysis each
category will be treated separately.
Proxy Violations
The simplest kind of class action that can be brought under the
securities laws is a case involving an alleged proxy violation, because
each member of the class is identifiable, the alleged wrong took place
alleged that corporate directors had violated their common-law fiduciary duties by selling their
control stock at an illegal premium. The plaintiff challenged the sale in a class action brought
on behalf of all other shareholders; although total damages were estimated to be $1,200,000,
the plaintiff alleged that her own damages were only $8,740. Because the plaintiff's own dam-
ages were less than $10,000, the Supreme Court held that federal courts were without jurisdic-
tion.
If diversity of citizenship jurisdiction had existed in the Snyder case for a derivative action
(instead of a class action), the amount in controversy would have been the entire $1,200,000
and diversity jurisdiction would have existed. The landmark case of Perlman v. Feldmann, 219
F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), in which jurisdiction was based on diversity, involves facts that were
very similar to those alleged in Snyder.
12. Zahn v. International Paper Co., - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1972).
13. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
14. Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
16. Id. § 78j.
17. Id. § 77k.
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at the same instant for all class members, and the damage to each
and every class member can be measured in the same manner. Thus,
two principal problems that may plague other types of class ac-
tions-identification of the class members and individual reli-
ance-are largely missing in a proxy-fraud case.
The elements of a class action brought under the proxy provisions
can best be explored through a discussion of the leading case in this
area, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.18 In Mills, the plaintiffs, who
were minority shareholders of Electric Auto-Lite Company, chal-
lenged their company's merger into Mergenthaler Linotype Com-
pany on the ground that the proxy statement of Auto-Lite's manage-
ment was materially false and misleading in violation of section 14(a)
of the Exchange Act. 9 The proxy statement, in seeking shareholder
approval of the merger, represented that Auto-Lite's directors recom-
mended approval of the merger; it failed to mention that since Mer-
genthaler owned a majority of Auto-Lite's stock, none of Auto-Lite's
directors were acting independently of Mergenthaler. The lower
courts agreed that there had been a material omission in the proxy
statement, but while the district court found the omission to have
affected the vote on the merger,2 the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the plaintiffs would be entitled to relief if and
only if the defendants could not show by a preponderance of probabil-
ities that the merger would have been approved anyway.2 1 The court
of appeals reasoned that if the terms were fair, the Auto-Lite share-
holders would have approved the merger whether or not their own
directors were vigilant.22 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed:
The decision below, by permitting all liability to be foreclosed on the basis
of a finding that the merger was fair, would allow the stockholders to be
bypassed, at least where the only legal challenge to the merger is a suit for
retrospective relief after the meeting has been held. A judicial appraisal of the
merger's merits could be substituted for the actual and informed vote of the
stockholders.
The result would be to insulate from private redress an entire category of
proxy violations-those relating to matters other than the terms of the merger.
Even outrageous misrepresentations in a proxy solicitation, if they did not
relate to the terms of the transaction, would give rise to no cause of action
18. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
20. 281 F. Supp. 826, 829 (N.D. I11. 1967).
21. 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968).
22. Id. at 436.
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under § 14(a). Particularly if carried over to enforcement actions by the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission itself, such a result would subvert the congres-
sional purpose of ensuring full and fair disclosure to shareholders.2
The Court suggested that whether or not most Auto-Lite sharehold-
ers would have voted for the merger had they known the truth about
their submissive directors might never be known.24 The Court rea-
soned, however, that once it is established that a proxy statement is
materially false, "that determination itself indubitably embodies a
conclusion" 5 that the shareholder vote cannot be allowed to stand.
Mills thus stands for the simple proposition that proxy statements
must be true. It epitomizes the need and worth of class actions, for
no one else could challenge Auto-Lite's proxy. Mills also illustrates
a defense that is raised in every class action: even assuming a state-
ment to be false, the class action should not be allowed because each
shareholder was affected individually by the falsehood. In ruling that
a materially false proxy statement is illegal per se, thus dispensing
with the requirement that each shareholder must be polled as to the
possible effects of the falsity, the Supreme Court posited a clear
guideline that directly overcomes one of the principal defenses to
class actions-the defense of individual reliance.2 6 Of equal import-
ance, Mills may also indicate, if somewhat indirectly, that the other
principal defense to class actions-the defense of unmanageabil-
ity-may not be a sturdy one. This defense is based on the undeniable
fact that it is impossible in many class actions to identify and repay
every injured class member. Although this was not the case in Mills,
the Supreme Court, by holding that a material falsehood is illegal per
se without requiring any further proof of causation, implied that a
class action can be sustained if a wrong is proven, whether or not
damages can also be proven by each class member. This conclusion
would mean that the only decisive issue in a class action brought
under the proxy provisions should be whether or not the defendants
acted legally. If they did, the case should be dismissed; if they did not,
the wrongdoers should be made to disgorge any illegally obtained
profits. The wrongdoer should not be permitted to argue that he
23. 396 U.S. at 381-82.
24. Id. at 382 n.5.
25. Id. at 384.
26. It has been suggested that Mills does not dispose of the reliance question in securities
actions. See Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule lOb-5, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 337,
349-56 (1971), citing cases in which class actions have been dismissed because of differences in
reliance among class members.
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should keep his illegal gain because there exists no method for pre-
cisely repaying each victim.
Another proxy-fraud class action, Percodani v. Riker-Maxson
Corp.,7 underscores the utility of class actions in the regulation of
proxy statements. A merger between Maxson Electronics Corpora-
tion and Riker Corporation was submitted to the respective share-
holders for their approval. The proxy statement provided that the
Riker shareholders would receive Maxson securities having "a fair
market value . . . at least equivalent" to the consideration received
by Maxson's principal shareholders. A Riker shareholder challenged
the merger terms on the ground that the Riker shareholders were, in
fact, being offered securities having a value substantially less than
what the Maxson insiders had received, a fact which was exactly
contrary to the information set forth in the proxy statement. The
court ruled that the Riker shareholders had, indeed, been given much
less than they had been promised, so that the information contained
in the proxy statement was false.2 The defendants argued, however,
that even if the proxy statement were false, none of the Riker share-
holders were harmed by the misrepresentation. They suggested that
Maxson owed no duty to the Riker shareholders to pay them any
particular price for their shares; consequently, the shareholders would
have received the same consideration regardless of the promises made
as to the value of the securities being offered. The court not only
rejected that defense but also rejected a settlement of $1,800,000 as
inadequate.29 Without a class action, Riker shareholders-mostly
persons with small holdings and generally unable to fend for them-
selves on an individual basis-would be without $3,200,000, the final
amount paid in settlement.3 1
No one would deny that all proxy statements are written more
carefully because of Mills and Percodani. This deterrent effect is in
itself a significant achievement of class actions. If the plaintiffs had
not prevailed in these cases, proxy statements would be largely unre-
gulated today.
27. 50 F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
28. Id. at 478.
29. Id. The initial claim was for $12,000,000. The court also rejected defendants' argument
that larger damages would cause liquidation of the corporation. Defendants were required to
prove Maxson's inability to pay more than the settlement price. Id. See also Comment, supra
note 26, at 350.
30. Percodani v. Riker-Maxson Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 93,337, at 91,812 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1972).
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Registration Statement Violations
Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes liability upon persons
responsible for a registration statement if the registration statement
or prospectus contains "an untrue statement of a material fact or
omit[s] to state a material fact required to be stated therein or neces-
sary to make the statements therein not misleading."' 3' Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp.32 illustrates the effect of class
actions brought under section 11. Defendant Leasco tendered an offer
for the stock of Reliance Insurance Company, a corporation having
no relation to Leasco. The gravamen of the complaint was that
Leasco deliberately failed to advise Reliance's shareholders that Reli-
ance had a surplus of $100,000,000. An immediate defense would be
that Leasco owed no duty to Reliance's shareholders. But the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, considering the fact that
"[s]ection 11 creates almost absolute liability in the issuer,"3 3 held
that Leasco and its inside directors were liable for not disclosing the
fact that Reliance had a surplus of $100,000,000 which Leasco wanted
to acquire. The importance of Leasco is not limited to the fact that
it vindicated a right of small shareholders; the broader implication
lies in the fact that, in response to the decision, every prospectus has
been drafted with particular care, for damages will necessarily flow
from an omission itself, and there is no need to show how the alleged
omission affected the judgment of each class member. 34
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
32. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
33. Id. at 575.
34. The class action aspects of Leasco were relatively simple. The class members, all
Reliance shareholders who had accepted Leasco's offer and had sold Leasco's securities during
a ten-week period, were readily identifiable. Other section II cases, however, are not so con-
fined. For example, if the alleged fraud is in the earnings statement-that is, if it is alleged
that earnings in a prospectus have been materially overstated-the class could be divided into
two groups: those who purchased the security on the public offering (a relatively easy group to
identify), and those who bought the security on the open market after the allegedly false
earnings statement appeared in the financial press (a relatively difficult group to identify).
An example of a court's preference for sub-classes in this type of case is Herbst v. Able, 45
F.R.D. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), in which Douglas Aircraft Company was charged with having
materially overstated its earnings. Class actions were initiated both by persons who had pur-
chased Douglas securities pursuant to a prospectus which included those allegedly false state-
ments and by those who had purchased Douglas securities on the open market after the earnings
had been reported publicly. Although the allegedly false earnings statements were identical, the
court created separate sub-classes for each of the categories of plaintiffs and appointed separate
general counsel. In explaining the possible need for separate classes, the court, in a later
decision in the case, indicated that the claims under section 11 might require a less rigid
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Registration statement violations, like proxy statement viola-
tions, are monitored more effectively by class actions than by any
other device. It is true, of course, that the Securities and Exchange
Commission retains great powers, but rarely does the Commission
seek more than injunctive relief.35 The class action device provides
the only practical way in which those who are damaged by a false
registration statement can be repaid.
Since registration statements and proxy statements are carefully
worded legal instruments, they violate the securities laws relatively
infrequently. Nonetheless, class actions in the federal securities field
are expanding due to the flexibility afforded by the umbrella section
of the Exchange Act, section 10(b) of the Act and rule lOb-5 promul-
gated thereunder. Since section 10(b) has become the main theme in
federal securities class actions, it will be discussed in some detail.
Section 10(b) Violations
Stated simply, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 declare illegal any
fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."3
This section has been relied on in a great variety of class actions;37
indeed, critics of class actions have asserted that section 10(b) has
been so over-used and misused as to demonstrate the unworthiness
of the class action device. 38
In the typical section 10(b) class action, a company's publicly-
issued earnings report is challenged as false and misleading. If the
company's stock drops in value, any person who bought the security
after the earnings statement was published may bring a class action
on behalf of all other persons who bought the security after the
publication date.39 Occasionally, the allegedly false earnings state-
standard of proof of wrongdoing than the claims asserted under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act. Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But whether or not this is true, it is
clear that the class members affected by a violation of section 11 are far more readily identifia-
ble than those members of the broader class buying Douglas securities on the open market over
a period of many months. Consequently, a greater percentage of section 11 claimants than the
section 10(b) claimants are likely to be repaid for their damages.
35. But see SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972) (court
granted the SEC's demand that the money be returned to the defrauded investors).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972).
37. In Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U. S. 977
(1969), the Second Circuit acknowledged that one-third of all securities actions are rule lOb-5
cases.
38. See AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERs ASS'N, supra note 4, at 18-19.
39. See Herbst v. Able, 45 F.R.D. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See note 34 supra.
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ment is not discovered to be false for several years, so that the class
which brings an action may consist of hundreds of thousands of
persons who bought the security before the revelation." Furthermore,
when a company makes an adjustment in a given year, such as a
write-off or write-down of assets, it is often alleged in the complaint
that the write-down should have been incurred earlier and that the
failure to do so renders the previously reported earnings statement
misleading. Again, the class may consist of hundreds of thousands of
persons, most of whom cannot be easily identified.4" Interestingly,
one of the most often cited section 10(b) class action cases, Green v.
Wolf Corp.,42 involved a class of only 2,200 persons, although the
class encompassed anyone who bought securities of Wolf Corpora-
tion over an eighteen-month period. While Green may be atypical
because of the small size of the class involved, its holding has been
broadly applied:
[A] class action may well be the appropriate means for expeditious litigation
of the issues, because a large number of individuals may have been injured,
although no person may have been damaged to a degree which would have
induced him to institute litigation solely on his own behalf.43
Class action difficulties grow, of course, with the size of the class.
For example, in one section 10(b) case,44 4,458,400 shares of a com-
pany's stock were traded during the five-week period involved in the
lawsuit, and approximately 36,000 stock certificates were issued dur-
ing that period by the transfer agent. Since the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit had established the merits of the case by holding
that certain press releases were materially false and misleading," the
40. Most section 10(b) cases include the allegation that earnings were overstated. See Siegel
v. Realty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Garber v. Randell, Civil
No. 70-835 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 7, 1970). The complaint in Garber includes the allegation
that the earnings figures reported by National Student Marketing Corporation were overstated
for the years 1968 and 1969.
41. Identification is difficult for several reasons: much stock is owned in "street names";
some of the persons who bought stock during the period may not be in the class because they
sold the stock at a profit before the revelations were made (in addition, this group is difficult
to delineate); finally, since the wrong may have taken place years before the action was begun
and since the case itself might require several additional years to litigate, the existing records
of names and addresses may be stale. See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 130 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 1i, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
42. 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
43. 406 F.2d at 296.
44. Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
45. SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
920 (1969).
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class action was settled, and members of the class were invited by
notice to submit their claims. Many persons who were injured by the
fraud did not submit a claim. Obviously, some members of the class
did not receive notice; other class members may not have bothered
to examine their records and fill out the necessary forms. Despite
these imperfections, the only method for vindicating the claims of the
class members was a class action.
The real problem of section 10(b) class actions is not the fact that
the class is often very large and, in turn, difficult to identify and
locate, but rather the fact that the merits of some section 10(b) ac-
tions are sometimes thought to be thin.4" As previously noted, cases
that challenge a prospectus or proxy statement involve a challenge to
carefully written legal documents. Many section 10(b) cases, on the
other hand, are based on press releases often hastily written with little
thought as to the possible legal consequences. Thus, persons responsi-
ble for drafting these press releases often argue that little evidence
exists to support a section 10(b) claim that a press release was issued
for fraudulent purposes. Rather, any inaccuracies in the press release
are usually attributable to the difficulty of drafting under time pres-
sures a comprehensive statement in the form of a news release. This
problem was underscored by Judge Friendly in his concurring opinion
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.:17 "[t]he consequences of holding
that negligence in the drafting of a press release. . . may impose civil
liability on the corporation are frightening. 48 The Texas Gulf Sul-
phur case presents this problem in a nutshell. A press release was
drafted under great time pressure by non-lawyers for non-lawyers.
There was no suggestion that the drafters did not intend for the
release to be accurate. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that the
press release was inaccurate and the market price of Texas Gulf
Sulphur's stock reflected those inaccuracies, thereby damaging tens
of thousands of investors. A vigorous dissent challenged what it con-
sidered to be the majority's "utterly unrealistic approach to the prob-
lem of the corporate press release," observing that, for purposes of
finding liability, a press release should not be treated as a prospec-
tus.49
46. The relationship between the merits of an action and its class status is discussed in
Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971) and Lamb v. United Security Life
Co., CCH 1972 FED. Sac. L. REP. 93,489 (S.D. Iowa, May 22, 1972).
47. 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
48. 401 F.2d at 866.
49. Id. at 888.
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The fact is, however, that far more investors rely on press releases
than on prospectuses. What courts under section 10(b) have done is
to make a corporation, and possibly its accountants, directors, and
officers, responsible for the accuracy of the information disclosed to
investors through any medium of communication.5 ° If what was said
to the public was knowingly or carelessly false, there should be a
recovery, for the very purpose of the federal securities laws is full and
honest disclosure.5 1 Class actions-and the specter of class actions 2
-have become the single most important factor in the enforcement
of these laws.
The legal developments resulting from section 10(b) class actions
extend, however, beyond the securities laws. Although section 10(b)
has often been described as the statutory reflection of common-law
fraud, one of the elements of a fraud case-the element of reli-
ance-is being made obsolete in section 10(b) actions. It is clear that
if reliance were a necessary element in a section 10(b) case, a class
action could not be brought because the extent to which a person
relied on the alleged fraud would be a highly individual matter.
The law has responded to this problem so that individual reliance
is no longer an element in a section 10(b) class action if an alleged
omission is the crux of wrong.53 But even where the alleged wrong
is a positive misstatement, the element of reliance is being by-
passed. 4 If a complaint alleges that as a result of a misstatement the
50. Accountants, directors and officers have long been subject to liability under section
10(b). See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969) (directors and officers); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (accoun-
tants). The SEC has recently brought an action naming not only the company's accountants
but also its lawyers as defendants. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp.,filed, Civil No. 225-
72, D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972.
51. See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
52. Haunted by the Penn Central's collapse and threatened by lawsuits over inaccur-
ate or misleading corporate financial reports, outside directors and auditors are creating
an "early warning system" to detect corporate problems before they develop into crises.
It's called the audit committee. Wall St. J., May 31, 1972, at 36, col. I.
The same point concerning the deterrent effects of lawsuits was made in regard to derivative
actions by Judge Rifkind in Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1942):
The measure of effectiveness of the stockholder's derivative suit cannot be taken by
a computation of the money recovery in the litigated cases. The minatory effect of such
actions has undoubtedly prevented diversion of large amounts from stockholders to
managements and outsiders. Corporate attorneys now have an arsenal of authorities to
support their cautioning advice to clients who may be disposed to risk evasion of the
high standard the courts have imposed upon directors. Id. at'526.
53. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
54. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
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market price of a security was artificially inflated, a class action
should be upheld on the theory that everyone paid the same excessive
price, whether or not he read the misstatement. Thus, the test of
section 10(b) liability is beginning to center around the question of
whether a wrong was committed that caused damage. Causation is
replacing reliance.55
In the securities setting, where tens of millions of shares are
traded everyday, it makes little sense to prevent a recovery for a false
statement simply because many, or even most, class members may
not have read that statement. Each class member paid a higher price
as a result of the false statement, whether he read it or not. Accord-
ingly, courts in section 10(b) cases have found it necessary to by-pass
the roadblock of reliance.
The defense of reliance has been only one of the high hurdles that
plaintiffs in class actions have had to overcome. The other principal
barrier is the defense of unmanageability. In many situations, defen-
dants correctly argue that there is no method by which each member
of a class can be made whole. From that premise, defendants argue
that a class action cannot lie. It is suggested in the following discus-
sion, however, that as a result of class actions in antitrust cases,
techniques are being developed to avoid the anomalous situation of
permitting the wrongdoer to profit from his own wrong simply be-
cause the class is considered to be unmanageable.
CLASS ACTIONS IN ANTITRUST CASES
The most difficult problem facing the courts in antitrust class
actions is the need to create techniques which solve the unmanagea-
bility problem that accompanies any class action with a large number
of rembers.5" Courts have responded to the problem by devising
F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D.
584, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
55. See I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW § 8.6, at 209 (1971). This development in the
law is parallel to the changes that made the element of privity obsolete in the early days of the
automobile.See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
In that situation, it made no sense to hold a dealer liable while providing immunity for the
manufacturer when the cause of action arose as a result of a defective automobile. For a general
discussion of class actions in the consumer fields, see Julien, Products Liability-Are Class
Actions Available in Product Cases?, N.Y.L.J., May 31, 1972, at 1, col. 1; Comment,
Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70 MICH. L.
REv. 338 (1971).
56. Rule 23(b) states in part:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition: . . . (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact
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several fair and practical solutions. An example of such a solution is
illustrated by West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.," a civil action
based on an alleged violation of the antitrust laws by certain drug
manufacturers. In addition to actions by each of the states and cities
that had bought the drugs at illegally high prices, a class action was
brought on behalf of some 150,000,000 persons" who bought the
price-fixed drugs in the period 1953-1966. Obviously, there existed no
method by which the drug companies could repay each person who
had overpaid. Nevertheless, notices inviting persons who had pur-
chased the specific drugs to submit their claims were placed, in vir-
tually every general circulation newspaper in the United States. The
notice also advised persons of their right under Rule 23 to exclude
themselves from the lawsuit. As a result of these notices, 42 persons
requested that they be excluded and 38,000 persons filed claims for a
total of $16,500,000. The Pfizer case was settled, and, as was foreseen,
most of the settlement amount for members of the consumer class
went unclaimed. Even though each of the individuals who had bought
the drugs could not be repaid, the drug companies were not allowed
to retain their illegally-obtained profits; rather, application of the cy
pres doctrine allowed the unclaimed portion of the recovery to be
given to the states to support their present health care programs."
Although Pfizer was settled, the issue of whether the consumer
group constituted a proper class under Rule 23 was one of the ques-
tions before the Second Circuit. 1o The challenge to the propriety of
a consumer class action was made by another group, the wholesaler-
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: . . . (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action.
57. 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). See Shapiro, Consumer
Participation in Antitrust Class Actions (pts. 1-3), N.Y.L.J., May 30, 1972, at I, col. 1, May
31, 1972, at 1, col. 1, June 1, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
58. Affidavit by Arthur J. Galligan, Record, at 109a, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, appeal
docketed, Nos. 30934 & 72-1521, 2d Cir., 1972. This affidavit was submitted by the plaintiff
for the purpose of showing the manageability of the Eisen class.
59. Since Pfizer was settled, the cy pres payments were made by agreement among all the
parties. Nevertheless, the drug company defendants would doubtless have not paid so grand a
sum in settlement unless they feared losing an even larger sum if the case were litigated.
Furthermore, in approving the settlement, the appellate court suggested that the theory of
parens patriae might have been applicable to the case. 440 F.2d at 1089. See Comment, Wrongs
Without Remedy: The Concept of Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Anti-
trust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 570 (1970).
60. 440 F.2d at 1089.
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retailer class, which sought to recover for itself thirty-seven million
dollars allocated to the consumers' class. The essence of the challenge
was that a class action could not be brought because no method
existed for repaying the individual members of the class. The
wholesaler-retailer class argued that the consumer class was too
large, its members were unidentifiable, and the individual claims were
too small to be processed. The Second Circuit rejected this challenge
and held that the consumer class, estimated to include 150,000,000
persons, was a proper class under Rule 23. In so ruling, the court also
specifically upheld the method by which the class members had been
repaid.
Another antitrust class action that merits attention is Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin." The complaint in Eisen alleged that the two
brokerage firms transacting over 99 percent of the odd-lot business
on the New York Stock Exchange fixed the price of the odd-lot
differential in the period 1962-1966 in violation of the Sherman Act. 2
The number of class members approximated 6,000,000 persons. De-
fendants challenged the propriety of a class action, asserting that,
even if plaintiff prevailed on the merits, there existed no method to
repay those individuals who had overpaid, and, therefore, the class
was not manageable. The District Court for the Southern District of
New York, however, took a broader view. It reasoned that if the odd-
lot differential had been illegally fixed, defendants should not reap the
benefit. Since it was acknowledged that individual recovery would be
difficult to achieve because most of the 6,000,000 class members had
only small losses, the court indicated that it could fashion a recovery
technique that would be manageable: if the odd-lot differential were
found to be illegal under the antitrust laws, the wrongdoers could be
ordered to reduce the odd-lot differential in the future.63 Thus, the
wrongdoers would surrender their illegal profits, and the defense of
unmanageability would be by-passed. As a result, the class of odd-
lot buyers and sellers would be made whole, although each of the
individuals who overpaid because of the fixed price would not neces-
sarily be. compensated. The court's theory of recovery was buttressed
61. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 30934, 2d Cir., 1972; 54 F.R.D.
565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1521, 2d Cir., 1972.
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970). An odd-lot is a transaction involving fewer than 100 shares.
When an odd-lot is bought (or sold), the buyer (or seller) is charged an extra commission called
the odd-lot differential.
63. 52 F.R.D. at 264-65.
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by the specific finding that many of the odd-lot users of 1962-1966
continue to be odd-lot users, so "that the benefits of any recovery will
flow in the main to those who bore the burden of defendants' alleg-
edly illegal acts."64 As in Mills,6" the emphasis of the court was on
the merits of the claims, not in the ultimate proof of individual
damage.
The Eisen principle, denominated by the court as the "fluid class"
theory of damage recovery, is a practical solution to the manage-
ability problem existing in cases in which the class consists of millions
of persons who individually suffered relatively small damages. At-
tempting to ascertain and pay each class member his exact damages
may not only be too burdensome for the court, but may also be an
expense that would consume too great a portion of the recovery.
Consequently, courts have fashioned the fluid class theory in order
to distribute the recovery efficiently and economically. The first step
in applying the theory is to establish the amount of the gross damage,
a figure that is usually obtainable or ascertainable from the defen-
dants' records. 7 A damage fund is then created from which litigation
expenses and claims from class members possessing adequate proof
of these damages are deducted. The remainder of the damage fund
constitutes the general recovery to the rest of the class.6
An example of the application of the fluid class theory is found
in Bebchick v. Public Utilities Commission." In Bebchick, the Public
Utilities Commission in Washington, D.C. had approved a bus fare
increase from 20 to 25 cents per ride. This increase was challenged
by one bus rider. The bus company argued that notwithstanding the
legality or illegality of the increase, the case should be dismissed
because there existed no method for returning the five cents per ride
64. Id. at 264.
65. See notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
66. 52 F.R.D. at 264.
67. For example, in both Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 363, 171 P.2d
875 (1946), see notes 72-73 infra and accompanying text, and Bebchick v. Publib Util. Comm'n,
318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963), see notes 69-71 infra and
accompanying text, the precise amounts of the damages were determined. In Eisen, the plaintiff
was able to show that had the defendants effected the same change in the differential during
the period in question (1962-1966) that they effected in 1966, public savings from that change
alone would have been $4,934,000 annually. The defendants gave no reason why the reduction
could not have taken place earlier.
68. See Comment, supra note 55, at 364-65. However, in Eisen, the plaintiff has noted that
since 56% of the odd-lot transactions during the period in question are preserved on computer
tapes, it might be possible to give precise recovery to many small claimants.
69. 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
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to those who had allegedly overpaid. The court ruled, however, that
the fare increase was illegal. Having decided the merits of the case
in plaintiff's favor, the court had to fashion a recovery that would
force the bus company to return what it had illegally obtained. Had
no method of repayment been found, the court would have been in
the anomalous position of permitting the defendants to benefit from
their own wrong. The court recognized, of course, that separate re-
funds could not be made to each rider, but it fashioned another
solution:
It is not feasible to require refunds to be made to individuals who paid the
increase. Nevertheless, the amount realized by Transit from the increase must
be utilized for the benefit of the class who paid it, that is, those who use
Transit. To accomplish this Transit will be required to establish a fund in an
amount equal to the 5 cent increase collected during the specified period, in
other words, 5/25 or.20 per cent of the total cash fares collected . . . . The
utilization and disposition of the fund, or the special account or reserve, as the
case may be, shall be left to the discretion of the Commission having regula-
tory authority with respect to Transit, provided such discretion is exercised
consistently with the purpose of benefiting Transit users in any rate proceed-
ings pending or hereafter instituted. For example, the fund might be used to
over costs which otherwise might lead to an increase in fares, or might be
used to aid in determining whether fares should be reduced now or hereafter.70
The net result of the court's solution in Bebchick is that the defendant
repaid what it had improperly taken to "the class who paid it"-that
is, to the bus riders of Washington, D.C. To be sure, the individuals
who had overpaid would not individually receive their money back,
but the alternative of permitting the bus company to retain its ille-
gally obtained profits did not appear equitable to the court.71
Bebchick, it should be noted, was not the first utility case that
applied the fluid class theory. In Market Street Railway Co. v. Rail-
road Commission,72 the San Francisco trolley car company was held
to have charged one penny too much per ride. Rather than permit
the wrongdoer to be enriched by $700,000, the California Supreme
Court ordered that the full amount be turned over to the City of San
70. Id. at 203-04.
71. The defendant in Bebchick sought permission several years later to apply the reserve
to what it considered to be a needed fare increase, but the court held that no fare increase had
yet been justified. See Williams v. Washington Met. Area Transit Comm'n, 415 F.2d 922 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1081 (1969). Because of the result reached in Bebchick, transit
riders in the 1970's will be benefiting from the decision in 1963 that a fare increase made.
effective in 1960 was illegal.
72. 28 Cal. 2d 363, 171 P.2d 875 (1946).
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Francisco to be used for trolley car improvements. Under this ap-
proach, the defendant could not profit from his wrong and the fund
would "inure to the benefit of those whose payments accumulated the
fund."73
The fluid class theory has also been applied to steamship rates,74
garbage disposal fees,75 and, most dramatically, to taxi fares. In Daar
v. Yellow Cab Co.,7 a taxicab rider brought a class action on behalf
of all persons who had ridden in defendant's taxicabs in the previous
four years. The complaint alleged that the taxicab company had
purposely rigged its meters. This allegation was based on findings by
California's regulatory agencies and was not challenged; instead, the
defendant argued that the class action should be dismissed because
the overcharge could not be returned to the tens of thousands of
unidentified persons who had been wrongfully overcharged. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, sitting en banc, recognized that it would not
be possible to repay each member of the class but ruled that the trial
court should try to fashion "a procedure that would permit the alleg-
edly injured parties to recover the amount of their overpayments"
because such a procedure "is to be preferred" over permitting the
defendants to benefit from their own willful wrong. 7 The state of
California, in an amicus curiae brief, urged the court to make a
disposition that "would insure . . . that defendant would not retain
the alleged unjustly acquired benefits"; 7 and if no other procedure
could be devised, it urged that the overpayments be given to the state.
Since it was undisputed that the wrongdoers illegally rigged their taxi
meters, the court concluded that it should do whatever it could to
make the wrongdoers return their illegal gains. Daar was settled when
the defendant agreed to reduce its future taxi fares until the past
overcharges were repaid to the riding public. As in Eisen, Market
Street Railway and Bebchick, the Daar class would receive the bene-
fits although each of the individuals who had overpaid years earlier
might not, in fact, be repaid. 79
73. Id. at 373, 171 P.2d at 881.
74. Alaska S.S. Co. v. FMC, 344 F.2d 810, 815 n.4 (9th Cir. 1965).
75. Olson v. Superior Court, 274 Cal. App. 2d 316, 79 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1969).
76. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
77. Id. at 715, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
78. Id. at 715 n.15, 433 P.2d at 746 n.15, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738 n.15.
79. It has been suggested that Daar might not provide a foundation for the emergence of a
fluid class theory, as the California Supreme court stated in Daar and in Vasquez v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 815, 484 P.2d 964, 973, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 805 (1971), that individual
demonstration of damages was a requisite to recovery. See Comment, supra note 55, at 367.
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The fluid class theory also has support in the analogous situation
of derivative stockholder actions. In such cases, recoveries, when
made, are usually granted many years after the occurrence of the
alleged wrong. The recovery redounds, therefore, to the benefit of the
corporation's shareholders at the time of the recovery and not to
those shareholders who actually incurred the damage."0 This result in
derivative cases has never been questioned because the action is
brought on the corporation's behalf, and it is the corporation which
recovers; therefore, changes in the shareholder list have been consid-
ered irrelevant. It is only a slight extension of this argument to sug-
gest that for purposes of a class action, the class continues, even
though some of its members may change.
It is suggested, therefore, that unmanageability need not be a bar
to bringing a class action. Where a defendant charges a price for its
goods or services that is fixed by law, as in Eisen and Daar,
reductions could be made in the future until the overcharge is repaid
to the class. Where the price is not regulated, as in Pfizer, defendants
may be ordered to give the illegally obtained money to a charity or
philanthropic institution by invoking the cy pres doctrine. Finally,
defendants might be required to return their illegal profits to the
government for the specific benefit of the class who overpaid, as in
Market Street Railway, or for the good of the general population,
as was suggested by the state of California in Daar. In short, there
are indications that the law of class actions may be moving toward
the principle that a plaintiff's case depends only upon its substantive
merits, not upon defenses related to procedural aspects of the class
action. To be sure, most of the litigated cases espousing that view
have fashioned a technique for recovery which specifically benefits
the class on whose behalf the: action was begun. But these cases also
strongly imply that the more important factor is that the wrongdoers
should be forced to return their illegally obtained profits and not that
individual class members have a right to repayment. Indeed, some
precedents are possibly being shaped that would permit a plaintiff to
succeed in a class action even if there were no method by which the
class itself could directly receive the benefits."'
80. For an extreme example of ownership change, see Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp.
162 (D. Conn. 1952), rev'd, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), on remand, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn.
1957). The ultimate recovery went to a new owner who had purchased 95 percent of the-
company's shares subsequent to the wrongs alleged in the original complaint. See MOODY'S
INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2646 (1955).
81. See California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 977 (C.D. Cal. 1971), appeal docketed,
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As an indication of the recognition that has been given to the fluid
class theory, it is interesting to note that the editors of the Manual
for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation have proposed this addition
to the Manual:
In this connection, when there exists a class of millions, in which there is a
continuous substantial change in individual membership, if that class is enti-
tled to money relief, channeling such relief to the class with its current mem-
bership may result in substantial justice without incurring an unbearable ex-
pense in identifying the individual members of the original class.8"
The degree of acceptance which will be accorded these develop-
ments is as yet unclear, for the overwhelming number of cases still
adhere to an orthodox approach to class actions, and some courts still
maintain a strong bias against class actions. Perhaps the most ex-
treme illustration of the fact that progress towards liberality in class
action determinations has not been universal and that those actions
can still be hobbled, if not barred, by technical defenses is Zachery
v. R.H. Macy & Co.3 In Zachery, a New York court held that
several department stores were charging illegally excessive interest
rates. The names and addresses of virtually all of the customers, as
well as their interest charges, were preserved on computer tapes;
therefore, direct, precise, and relatively inexpensive recovery could
have been directed to those who overpaid. Even though the members
of the class could be readily identified and the plaintiff's claim was
meritorious, the court allowed the defendant to retain its illegally-
obtained profits by denying the procedural validity of the class ac-
tion. 4
No. 72-1269, 9th Cir., Feb. 8, 1972. The case is being appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1970). See also the discussion of parens patriae in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440
F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971). The parens patriae theory was also discussed by the United
States Supreme Court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972), but it was
rejected as a basis for recovery for treble-damage antitrust claims because of the availability
of class actions. Cf. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,494 (1968),
in which the Court upheld an antitrust judgment on the ground that otherwise the wrongdoers
would "retain the fruits of their illegality"; however, this case was not a class action.
82. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 1.43, at 28 (Feb. 1972
Draft).
83. 39 App. Div. 2d 116, 332 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1972). The New York Court of Appeals
reversed the Appellate Division on the merits and specifically declined to discuss the appropri-
ateness of a class action. - N.Y.2d _, - N.E.2d _ , N.Y.S.2d - (1973). It
should be noted that a federal court permitted a class action in the identical situation. See
Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
84. Although New York and California have virtually the same class action statute, the
two states are poles apart on class action determinations. California is perhaps the most
progressive state in the United States in this regard. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4
Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971) (en banc); Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson &
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PROCEDURAL DEFENSES IN CLASS ACTIONS
Although the law of class actions has developed broadening prin-
ciples of recovery in the securities and antitrust fields, certain proce-
dural rigidities, which are applicable to all Rule 23(b)(3) class actions
and, consequently, to securities and antitrust class actions, have also
developed. The principal procedural problem is created by the notice
requirement of Rule 23(c)(2). If the plaintiff must assume the expen-
ses of giving individual notice, the case, no matter how meritorious,
-would often be abandoned at an early stage. For an extreme example,
the defendants in Eisen wanted the plaintiff to mail individual notices
to each of the 2,000,000 persons who could be identified from com-
puter tapes.8 5 The cost, which would include $160,000 in postage
alone, could not be borne by the plaintiff, whose total damages were
$70.18 Some courts have, nevertheless, been inflexible, requiring the
plaintiffs either to bear the cost of notice or to abandon the lawsuit.8 7
Since such a result is clearly drastic, courts have begun to fashion a
new device, sometimes referred to as a "mini-hearing. ' 88 Under this
procedure, the court holds a preliminary hearing to determine the
plaintiff's chances of winning at trial. If the court determines that the
defendants will probably prevail, the plaintiff is required either to
assume the expenses of providing notice or to drop the suit. If, on
the other hand, the plaintiff's case appears to be strong, the defendant
is charged with the cost of the notice.
While some courts treat the notice requirement as more of a
technicality than a substantive bar, other courts have been more
literal in their interpretation of Rule 23(c)(2). This literal approach
is utilized by defendants, who almost invariably argue that extensive
and expensive notice is necessary, hoping thereby to terminate the
case before it reaches even the pre-trial stage. The defendants' princi-
pal argument has been that without full notice, class members are
Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d
695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). New York, on the other hand, is perhaps the most
conservative. See, e.g., Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311
N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970). For a helpful analysis of the class action law of New York, see Burman,
Class Actions, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 653 (1972).
85. 52 F.R.D. 253, 257, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
86. 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966).
87. See, e.g., Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Dolgow v. Anderson,
43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
88. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Dolgow v. Ander-
son, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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denied the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution. They
reason that Rule 23 permits any class member to be excluded and not
to be bound by the determination in the class action; therefore, a class
action cannot proceed unless and until every class member is person-
ally apprised of his right to be excluded. Defendants argue that if a
class action does proceed without all members having been personally
notified of their right to be excluded, the unnotified persons will have
been deprived of their rights under Rule 23(c)(2) without due process
of law. Defendants thus seek to benefit only themselves by seeking
an early dismissal of class actions when they pose as the champions
of plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
There are two answers to defendants' constitutional argument.
First, the essence of due process in class actions is the adequateness
of the class representative (and his attorney),89 not the sufficiency of
the notice. This argument is underscored by the second response to
defendants' argument. Typically, fewer than one percent of class
members request to be excluded;" consequently, there is little reason
to jeopardize the rights of over 99 percent of the class members by
treating the notice requirement as a substantive bar. Since Rule
23(c)(2)'requires only the "best notice practicable," notice in most
instances could be reduced to the level of a ritualistic requirement
without affecting any rights of the class members."
By analogy, it should be noted that in derivative litigation the
requirement of Rule 23.1 that the plaintiff make a prior demand upon
directors and shareholders before bringing the action or explain why
such demands were not made has long receded into a formality." The
decisive question in derivative cases is whether the defendants com-
mitted a wrong which caused damage. Perhaps the notice require-
ment in class actions should likewise be treated as a technicality so
that the merits of the plaintiff's allegations will be the focal point of
89. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
90. See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1083 (2d Cir. 1971) (42
individual purchasers requested to be excluded from a class of 150,000,000 persons); AMERICAN
TRIAL LAWYERS ASS'N, supra note 4, at 11.
91. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 568-70 (2d Cir. 1968), the court specifi-
cally rejected the argument that the requirement of notice could only be satisfied by a ritualistic
process. But see Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
92. See Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (Ist Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965);
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959). But see In re Kauffman Mut.
Fund Actions, 337 F. Supp. 1337 (D. Mass. 1972).
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the lawsuit. This is a development, however, that must await the
future.
In addition to the required notice informing a member of the class
that he may request to be excluded from the class action, it has been
argued in some cases that each class member should be required to
show an intent to be included in the class action.13 Thus, some courts
have held that only persons who submit their damage claims in ad-
vance of the trial remain as members of the class. Where this practice
is followed, class membership shrinks almost to the vanishing point.
At least one appellate court has recognized the dangers of such a
requirement and has refused to sanction its use.94
Thus, while most of the experience with class actions in the securi-
ties and antitrust fields has been concerned with developing new re-
covery techniques and obviating the need for individual reliance, the
requirements of notice and submission of damage claims before trial
have served as an anchor against change.
CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT
The development in class actions has been built, case by case,
largely by federal trial judges acting under Rule 23.11 Although the
law of other periods evolved over generations or even centuries, class
actions have come to maturity in faster-moving times. Litigation has
become prolific; consequently, the courts have gained the experience
in a few years that once took scores of years.
The rapidly expanding utilization of class actions, particularly in
the securities and corporate fields, has triggered controversy. It is
alleged that many meritless suits are brought which defendants must
settle only because of their huge potential liability (the so-called in
terrorem argument); it is alleged that class actions clog the courts;
and it is alleged that class actions benefit no one except the plaintiff's
lawyer.
93. See Lamb v. United Security Life Co., CCH 1972 FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,489, 92,368-
69 (S.D. Iowa, May 22, 1972). The Lamb court rejected this argument claiming that "failure
of members of the class to express interest in a lawsuit does not necessarily indicate an inade-
quacy in the representation. Id. at 92,368.
94. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972).
95. See generally Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class Actions Under
Federal Rule 23(b)3), 54 F.R.D. 501 (1972). Professor Miller has stated that class action rules
should remain flexible so that district court judges could continue to display the "ingenuity...
the innovativeness, the creativity [and] the sensitivity" which permitted them to manage "seem-
ingly unmanageable litigation." Statement by Arthur R. Miller, Meeting of the Board of
Editors for the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICr LITIGATION, Mar. 23, 1972.
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It is not suggested here that every class action is a worthy one.
However, certain points should be made. When a frivolous class
action is brought, defendants usually do not shy away from making
a vigorous defense, and since most defendants are substantial busi-
ness entities, they can easily afford to do so. On the other hand,
attorney's fees for plaintiff are contingent-that is, the plaintiff's
attorney is paid only if, when, and to the extent that be is successful
in recovering for the class. Thus, no motive exists for a lawyer to
undertake a class action suit that he considers unworthy. While it is
true that weak class actions are filed, the same charge could be made
against every branch of the law; yet no one suggests, for example, that
all antitrust litigation be barred because some antitrust cases are
easily dismissible. With respect to the allegation that class actions
clog the courts, it is suggested that Mr. Justice Black's argument is
persuasive, that court congestion, even were it to exist, "should not
weigh more heavily in our system of justice than assuring a full-
fledged, due process trial of every bona fide lawsuit brought to vindi-
cate an honest, substantial claim."9 The primary justification for
allowing class actions is that such actions are the only method by
which small claimants can vindicate their rights against large and
powerful defendants. Without class actions, huge wrongs would be
unremedied. Although critics have focused on the imperfections of
class actions, they-have failed to suggest any alternatives.
In broadly reviewing the development of class actions in the last
ten years, it should be noted that this development has reflected the
general, contemporary direction of the law to develop protections for
the individual. The right of one small investor to sue a large corpora-
tion to redress a wrong affecting thousands or even millions of per-
sons is an example of the same principle that guarantees to every
individual defendant in a criminal case the right to counsel," and
which holds that a private citizen can challenge in a court of law the
right of the United States to explode an atomic device. 8 As our
96. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 383
U.S. 1029, 1034 (Black, J., dissenting). The idea that class actions clog the courts is derived
not from judicial authorities but from defendants' own statements. See AMERICAN TRIAL LAW-
YERS ASS'N, supra note 4, at 13-15; Keeffe, California Style Class Suits and Corarn Nobls, 58
A.B.A.J. 773 (1972).
97. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
98. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 (1971). Other
types ofcases underscore the law's concern with individual rights. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family
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nation races into an era of a trillion-dollar-per-year economy domi-
nated by a few hundred corporate giants, it is a measure of the law's
continuing respect for the individual to permit one person, through
the device of a class action, to challenge alleged economic wrongs.
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (requiring notice and a hearing before garnishment of salary);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (each vote must be equal); Office of Communications
of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (listener can challenge
the renewal of a broadcasting license); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied. 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (private citizen can sue to prevent the
construction of a power plant).

